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Core Aspects of Dance: Schiller and Dewey on Grace
Joshua M. Hall
ABSTRACT
Part of a larger project of constructing a new, historically informed
philosophy of dance, built on four phenomenological constructs
that I call “Moves,” this essay concerns the third Move, “grace.” The
etymology of the word “grace” reveals the entwined meanings of
pleasing quality and authoritative power, which may be combined
as “beautiful force.” I examine the treatments of grace in German
philosopher Friedrich Schiller, who understands it as playful, na€ıve
transformation of matter; and in American philosopher John Dewey,
for whom it represents rhythmic organism/environment reversal.
I conclude by showing how “grace” can be used in analyzing various
types of dance, which in turn suggests transformational potential for
philosophy, dance, and society as a whole.
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This essay is part of a larger project in which I create a historically informed phi-
losophy of dance, called Figuration, built around four central concepts or “Moves.”
This new philosophy of dance has two major parts, analyzing (1) four basic con-
cepts or “Moves”—namely “positure,” “gesture,” “grace,” and “resilience”—within
the context of (2) seven types or “families” of dance—namely “concert,” “folk” (or
vernacular), “societal,” “agonistic,” “animal,” “astronomical,” and “discursive.
Devoted to the third of the four Moves, this essay examines the importance of
grace for two major thinkers in the history of philosophy, Friedrich Schiller and
John Dewey, and also touches upon the applicability of grace to the seven postu-
lated families of dance. In the larger project, I deﬁne “grace” as “superabundantly
playful, ﬁgure/ground reversing, meta-human gifting,” but for reasons of space I
limit the focus here to superabundantly playful and ﬁgure/ground reversing.1
The reason for my combined phenomenological and historical approach is that a
phenomenological analysis of my own dance experience initially generatedmy theori-
zation of the Moves (including grace), and the treatment of these concepts in diverse
philosophical thinkers across the history of philosophy both buttresses the scope of
their applicability and increases their subtlety and sophistication. By the word “phe-
nomenological,” I mean to signify a process in which I attend to the way I experience
dance, or how it appears tomy conscious, embodied being in the world. In this regard,
 I use the term “folk” to echo the effective use of this term in critical race theory and queer theory. For example, in
The Souls of Black Folk (New York: Modern Library, 2003), W. E. B. Du Bois refers to “black folk” to convey a sense of
disempowered peoples as fully human and deserving of the respect accorded to “ordinary” people. The reason for
this effectiveness, perhaps, is that “folk” is a “down-to-earth” Germanic term.
© 2017 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
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I follow in the footsteps of the pioneering work of Edmund Husserl on phenomenol-
ogy as further developed by Martin Heidegger.2 As for the title of the larger project,
the word “ﬁguration” derives from “ﬁgure,” which comes from the Latin word
schema, a transliteration of the Greek sxήma. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED)
offers twenty-six numbered deﬁnitions of “ﬁgure,” the meanings of which include
bodily shape, attitude, posture, mathematical form, conspicuous appearance, a dia-
gram of the heavens, a move or set of moves in a dance, a musical phrase, and a meta-
phor. “Figuration” thus encapsulates in one word, via its etymological root, almost
my entire project. My rationale for constructing a historically informed philosophy of
dance is that I am convinced of the value of considering the contributions of major
historical ﬁgures in philosophy vis-a-vis dance, because most panoramic efforts in the
philosophy of dance thus far have been content to try to construct a comprehensive
account of dance in the present—in other words, guided by one or several contempo-
rary theoretical frameworks. One fringe beneﬁt of my approach is that any trends
that recur in the analyses of thinkers from across the history of Western philosophy
would seem to be signiﬁcant for any dance-studies theorist to consider today.
It is also worth noting that the discussion of families of dance amounts to an exten-
sional deﬁnition of dance, or a list of types of things in the world to which the word
“dance” refers. By contrast, an intensional deﬁnition of “dance” would attempt to
describe the essential qualities that something would have to possess in order to count
as dance. One might deﬁne “dance” as the art of movement for its own sake, as an
example of the latter. Such a deﬁnition would be unacceptable, however, to many con-
temporary thinkers, because it would exclude many forms of dance, including ritual,
that function efﬁcaciously. In other words, it would mean that a dance that also served
some instrumental purpose would be disqualiﬁed. The infamous inadequacy (or at
least controversial status) of intensional deﬁnitions is the main reason why I prefer to
emphasize the extensional approach. Although there is a certain degree of arbitrariness
to the seven particular families I have selected, each reﬂects a “natural kind” of rhetoric
of dance as applied to various phenomena, many of which are not conventionally
understood as dance. Here, I follow “ordinary language” philosophers, such as J. L.
Austin, in seeking ontological categories in the ways that everyday language users
speak, rather than imposing metaphysical categories—despite the friction or disso-
nance between those metaphysical categories and everyday language.3
To elaborate on this point, by “dance” I mean the following seven clusters or
“families” (to use twentieth-century philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein’s term) of
meanings: concert dance, folk dance, societal dance, agonistic dance, animal dance,
astronomical dance, and discursive dance. These families, then, are my own rough
 Wittgenstein is widely recognized as one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century. In his early
masterpiece Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, he attempted to create the perfect artiﬁcial language, and in his later
work, especially Philosophical Investigations, he explored the irreducibly contextual and behavioral aspects of human
language. For more on Wittgenstein and other philosophers mentioned in this paper, consult online resources such
as The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (https://plato.stanford.edu) and Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(http://www.iep.utm.edu/), keeping in mind the caveat that entries inevitably reﬂect the (often controversial) inter-
pretations and personal philosophical commitments of contributing authors.
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attempt to get at the different kinds of phenomena that contemporary Western
culture refers to as dances. Examples of each of the seven are ballet, clogging, salsa,
tae kwon do, the pollen dance, “falling stars,” and Pablo Neruda’s poetry, respec-
tively. At the end of this essay, I return to an analysis of each of these speciﬁc dance
forms (as an exemplar of its family) with regard to how it is integrally linked with
grace, as illuminated by Dewey and Schiller.
One potential objection to the larger project might be that these seven families seem
too radically different to belong together at all. Consider, however, that there is at least
one thing that all of them have in common—namely, that each is concerned with
movement for its own sake. Moreover, one could argue that even in the case of ritual,
dance is ultimately concerned with movement for its own sake. While rituals may be
performed to achieve certain purposes or to fulﬁll certain societal functions, nonetheless
the dance in a ritual reﬂects a somewhat arbitrary aesthetic or preferred/valued way of
moving within a given community. And these ways of moving, across cumulative gen-
erations, ultimately amount to the way that the community as a whole moves through
history. That is to say, external societies view a given society’s ways ofmoving, especially
in rituals, as arbitrary. As such, these ways of moving become interpreted, across the
history of the society’s interactions, as constituting part of its aesthetic essence (as it
were). Consider, for example, the contrasting rituals of handshaking in Western coun-
tries versus bowing in China (among other countries).
In this essay, I focus on the third Move, grace (the other three Moves in my his-
torically inﬂected philosophy being positure, gesture, and resilience). According
to the OED, the word “grace” derives from the Ancient Greek kharis (meaning “to
carry out, perform”), which suggests the two most important aspects of this Move
for the purposes at hand. First, kharis is the source of the English words “charisma”
and “charm,” and means, at an etymological level, both “pleasing quality” and
“authoritative power.” Second, at a conceptual level, kharis is the root for the name
of the ancient Greek goddesses of charm, beauty, nature, human creativity, and
fertility, called the Karites (origin of the Latin caritas and English “charity”) or
“Graces.” The signiﬁcance here is that, historically, literature and the visual arts
have depicted the Graces, minor goddesses, as dancers, which suggests that grace
 The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) deﬁnes the word “positure” as an archaic form of the word “posture.” It is partic-
ularly useful in showing the links between the positing of poetry and the posing of dance because (1) “positing” is
linked to poetry via the Greek word for poetry, poesis, which Aristotle uses to describe how various philosophers
posit different phenomena (such as ﬁre and love) as the basic material of the cosmos, and (2) “posture” is linked to
“poses” that can be understood as the building blocks of a dance.
It might be helpful, at this point, to say a few words about the Moves in general. I ﬁnd it meaningful that, although
initially generated through a phenomenological analysis of my own dance experience—in an attempt to isolate a
small cluster of concepts or constructs that could be considered central aspects of dance—they align nicely (without
any premeditation on my part) with Rudolf Laban’s Movement Analysis. See Jean Newlove, Laban for Actors and
Dancers (New York: Routledge, 1993). More speciﬁcally, and to give a general sense of the meaning of the other
Moves, they correspond closely to what Laban called the four effort dimensions: weight, space, ﬂow, and time. Posi-
ture, like weight, involves the muscular tension of the body. Gesture, like space, involves different degrees of direc-
tion and indirection in moving through space to accomplish a given task. Grace, like ﬂow, has to do with whether a
motion is executed freely, as in a perfect conduit-relation to the environment, or with the expectation of sudden
interruption. And resilience, like time, involves a distinction between sudden action and sustained movement.
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is a divine gift (as in “the grace of God” in the Judeo-Christian-Islamic theological
tradition) and associated with dance.
To explore grace, this essay examines the explicit treatments of dance in the works of
the German poet, historian, and playwright Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805) and the
American psychologist, political activist, and educator John Dewey (1859–1952). In the
ﬁrst section, I offer an analysis of grace as “beautiful force” with reference to three of
Schiller’s major works, namelyOn the Aesthetic Education ofMan, “OnNa€ıve and Sen-
timental Poetry,” and “‘Kallias or Concerning Beauty: Letters to Gottfried K€orner.’”4
Speciﬁcally, I attempt to show how grace lies at the heart of (1) the play impulse, (2) the
na€ıve way of thinking/being/writing, and (3) the perfect transformation of matter that
occurs in the case of beauty, respectively. In the second section, I analyze grace as
“organism/environment reversal,” drawing on Dewey’s Art as Experience.5 Speciﬁcally,
I attempt to show how grace, by its proximity to Dewey’s concept of rhythm, illumi-
nates the central importance of dance in his philosophy of art. To wit, dance is closely
connected to both grace and rhythm, and Dewey refers to dance in Art as Experience
more often than does any other author of a canonical text in the philosophy of art.
Moreover, my analyses of these two thinkers constitute an opportunity to attend to two
important philosophers whose work (especially in the case of Schiller) is largely ignored
by philosophers today. My goal is to create a historically informed philosophy of dance
with important implications for dance, philosophy, and their shared worlds.
Grace as charm and power in Schiller
Philosophy’s studied indifference, throughout most of its history, to dance necessi-
tates an indirect approach. Hence, I explore the ramiﬁcations and implications of
grace in Schiller and Dewey ﬁrst in general, larger contexts, then in contexts
speciﬁc to dance.
The ﬁrst two of the three texts that I analyze from Schiller, On the Aesthetic Edu-
cation of Man and “‘Kallias or Concerning Beauty,’” are in the form of a series of
letters, each constituting a kind of back and forth, or a dialogic process, between
Schiller himself as the communicating ﬁgure, and the person to whom he is
writing.y That is, Schiller’s ideas, which occupy the foreground, make sense only as
a result of the frame or background provided by his interlocutor. Some ideas are
only (or best) expressed in dialogical form. Many philosophers think this is the rea-
son that Plato, for example, wrote dialogues rather than treatises. And one can eas-
ily imagine many of Shakespeare’s insights being less powerful, and in many cases
impossible, had they not taken place in the back and forth of a conversation.
 Later in Greek history these goddesses were reduced in number to three: Algaea (which means “beauty” or “splen-
dor”), Euphrosyne (“mirth” or “joy”), and Thalia (“good cheer” or “ﬂourishing”), understood to be the daughters of
Zeus and an Oceanid named Eurynome. For more on their connection to dance, see Francis Sparshott’s groundbreak-
ing essay, “On the Question: Why Do Philosophers Neglect the Aesthetics of the Dance?,” Dance Research Journal,
vol. 15, no. 1 (1982): 5–30.
y On this dialogic process, see also Gediminas Karoblis, “Dance and Dizziness: Knut Hamsun’s and Fyodor Dostoyev-
sky’s Kinesthetic Imagination of Collapse,” Dance Chronicle, vol. 38, no. 2 (2015): 161–87.
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Returning to Schiller—he wrote both series of letters in 1793, signed them with
his own name, and initially sent them to real persons. Afterward, Schiller expanded
and revised the letters for publication (in a journal he founded, called The Graces,
among other venues).6 In the case of Aesthetic Education, the addressee is the
Danish prince Friedrich Christian of the House of Schleswig-Holstein-Augusten-
borg. And in the case of “Concerning Beauty,” the addressee is Gottfried K€orner.
The prince had provided support to Schiller, and K€orner was a friend and promi-
nent judge who was a great patron of the arts. Additionally, at least in the case of
“Concerning Beauty,” we know that Schiller’s recipient also wrote a series of letters
in response.7 But for both series of letters, Schiller had to tailor his thoughts in the
letters to a speciﬁc person, embodied and socially positioned, in order to be maxi-
mally persuasive.
One can also ﬁnd this back and forth at a second level in Aesthetic Education.
The very ﬁrst paragraph of the First Letter, where Schiller describes the letters
(in the collected edition of them) as a series of “enquiries into Beauty and Art,” pro-
claims that in such a task “one is compelled to appeal as often to feelings as to prin-
ciples.”8 Hence, the second type of back and forth happens at the level of content,
or within the dialogical relationship between feelings and principles. Put another
way, while any systematic inquiry requires principles, for Schiller the subject matters
of art and beauty demand that feeling be given its due. A tension results from the
process of intellectual inquiry, in which principles tend to become abstract and
move away from feeling; hence, philosophers may, at times, seem to be apathetic or
even dismissive toward feelings. Schiller, by contrast, desires to reintegrate the two.
Schiller directs the reader to the political world as early as the ﬁrst paragraph of
the Second Letter, which describes politics as “the most perfect of all works of art,”
and art as “the building up of true political freedom.” Additionally, the Second Let-
ter concludes by uniting aesthetic and political concerns, noting that, “it is through
Beauty that we arrive at Freedom.”9 One ﬁnds already, in this formula, the two
etymological halves of grace: the power (to be free) and the pleasing quality
(of beauty).
Letters three and four introduce the speciﬁc aesthetic-political strategy that the
rest of the letters will develop—a kind of coalition between the arts and politics.
“Man,” according to the Third Letter, “does not rest satisﬁed with what Nature has
made of him, but possesses the capacity of retracing again, with his reason, the
steps which she anticipated with him, of remodeling the work of need into a work
of free choice.”10 Note the circular or spiraling aspect of this project. The idea is
not to make ourselves into objectively new beings, but to retrace our objectivity
with our subjectivity, so that we may rationally afﬁrm what already exists in us.
Here again is the dialogical relationship: Schiller suggests we move from nature to
culture and, from there, back to nature in a new way.
The Fourth Letter restates this project at the political level, deﬁning the “pure,
ideal man” as “represented by the State.” The “unalterable unity” of this ideal man
stems from his harmonized “existence” as an aesthetically educated human
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being.11 That is, such a man is the asymptotic ideal toward which aesthetic educa-
tion aims. Here, Schiller brings the subjects of politics and aesthetics together
again, through the rhetoric of music—speciﬁcally “harmony.” (Schiller has been
criticized as a forerunner of the aestheticizing of politics among the Nazis.12)
A word with a similar musical denotation, but which adds connotations of con-
crete physicality, is found in the Sixth Letter, which speaks of “even tempering” as
necessary for happy lives—foreshadowing a dance yet to come in the letters. The
Seventh and Tenth Letters also foreshadow Schiller’s discussion of dance, albeit for
a very different reason—namely because dancing has long been strongly linked in
the Western imaginary with “Negroes” and “savages.” The Seventh Letter, in the
Romantic tradition of idealizing the “noble savage,” speaks of how “humanity may
be respected in the negro [sic], while it is dishonoured in the thinker.” A similar
tone is struck in the Tenth Letter, where Schiller notes that “the pinions of genius”
“border very closely upon savagery.”13 In short, Schiller’s analysis integrates the
feelings of music, the archetype of the passionate “savage,” and the arts in general.
On a similarly violent note, the Eighth Letter includes the following passage,
which preﬁgures similar claims later made famous in the work of Friedrich Nietz-
sche: “If Truth is to gain the victory in the struggle with Force, she must ﬁrst
become herself a force, and ﬁnd some impulse to champion her in the realm of phe-
nomena; for impulses are the only motive forces in the sensible world” (emphasis
added).14 Force is clearly a physical phenomenon, and impulse is certainly a bodily
one. Thus, Schiller advocates an aesthetic solution to the problem of truth’s “vic-
tory,” and dance would seem to be an ideal candidate for the job. Dance, I would
argue, is particularly well-suited for transforming truth into a bodily force.
The Ninth Letter, hearkening back to Plato’s arguments in his last dialogue,
Laws, reveals additional insights related to violence and physicality. Here, Schiller
argues for driving “away lawlessness, frivolity and coarseness from [people’s] plea-
sure” in order to “imperceptibly banish [these qualities] from their actions and
ﬁnally their dispositions.” His admonition continues: “Wherever you ﬁnd them,
surround them with noble, great and ingenious forms, enclose them all round with
symbols of excellence, until actuality is overpowered by appearance and Nature by
Art.”15 The opposites of lawlessness, frivolity, and coarseness are lawfulness, seri-
ousness, and smoothness, which, by inference, Schiller ties to Art’s overpowering
of Nature. As a dancer, I think I am not alone in ﬁnding a strong resonance
between Schiller’s “noble, great and ingenious forms” and the disciplined move-
ments of dance, which stand in opposition to the untrained, reckless, and restless
ones of everyday life.
One might object that a tension exists between the claim for dance’s seriousness
and the previous attribution of playfulness, but I would argue that there exists such
a thing as serious or earnest playfulness. If one considers the example of a child
who is hard at work playing make-believe, spending hours meticulously crafting
imaginary landscapes, the earnestness of play becomes immediately apparent.
Moreover, dance’s playfulness derives (at least in part) from dancers’ willingness
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to be disciplined, working long hours, with exceptional focus and intensity, at
something that may appear to be pointless and silly to many in our society.
Thus, using dance to ﬂesh out Schiller’s proposition, one could imagine a ring of
dancers closing in on the ignorant novice in a great circle, as a symbol of the Art of
political life transforming the human animal in its state of Nature. Moving from
an imaginary exercise to actual historical precedent, consider the famous case of
the court of Louis XIV, in which formal dance was intertwined with politics.16
More speciﬁcally, Louis invested heavily, and frequently took part in, dance per-
formances; he even attempted to model the structure and appearance of his court
on the musical harmony of the celestial bodies.
In short, various moments in Schiller’s Aesthetic Education resonate in general
with dance. However, explicit accounts of grace in particular also occur. The Tenth
Letter marks the ﬁrst of seven appearances of the words “grace” and “the Graces”
in the following passage:
The man lacking in form despises all grace of diction as corruption, all elegance in social
intercourse as hypocrisy, all delicacy and loftiness of demeanor as exaggeration and affec-
tation. He cannot forgive the favourite of the Graces for brightening every circle by his
company, for turning all heads towards his designs in public affairs, for impressing his
spirit perhaps on his whole century by his writing, while he himself, the victim of drudg-
ery, can with all his knowledge enforce no attention, move no single stone from its
place.17 (emphasis added)
Here, several ideas emerge as worthy of note for the project of understanding
grace. First, Schiller links grace and the Graces in successive sentences, invoking
divinity in the arenas of both “microcosmic” and “macrocosmic” social worlds.
That is, the gracefulness of people in the social world is intimately connected to
the mythical grace of the Graces among the gods. (Schiller reinforces this connec-
tion in the next letter, when he asserts that “the path to divinity… is open to [the
human] in his senses” (emphasis in original).18 Second, Schiller links the grace of a
person’s diction to his political grace as a savvy citizen. In other words, speaking
beautifully is the small-scale equivalent of climbing the political ladder. Third,
Schiller again “cashes out” grace in terms of physical force in the actual world—in
this instance, in a metaphorical way, with the image of a stone that cannot be
moved without grace. Fourth, Schiller remains to this day what critical epistemolo-
gists call an “insider-outsider” in the world of philosophy—someone located on
the fringes of a social group who can perceive that group from both insider and
outsider perspectives. In light of Schiller’s graceful writing and the implications of
his ideas for aesthetics and the arts, his exclusion from the canon is ironic, but far
from uncommon. Numerous ﬁgures occupy the margins of philosophy, who,
despite their diversity, share with Schiller a rich writing style and a more inclusive
and deferential treatment of dance. Examples include Etienne Bonnot de Condil-
lac, Friedrich Nietzsche, Ralph Ellison, Julia Kristeva, and Luce Irigaray.19
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To witness how grace functions in Schiller’s thought one must turn to his Four-
teenth Letter, which introduces the centrally important concept of “the play
impulse”—an impulse combining the “sensuous” and “formal” impulses that he
derives from Kant. The sensuous impulse, for both Schiller and Kant, is one that
seeks variety, and does so through matter and its perceptual stimulations. The for-
mal impulse, by contrast, seeks freedom, and does so through the laws of morality.
Schiller explains that the play impulse, insofar as it is a combination of the other
two impulses, “will endeavor to receive [from the material world] as it would itself
have produced, and to produce [with its moral freedom] as the sense [impulse]
aspires to receive.” Put differently, the play impulse wants the world to present
itself as (1) the impulse’s own beautiful perceptual creation, which also (2) can be
further crafted in a morally satisfying fashion. Because of the play impulse, Schiller
later explains, “everything actual,” when “it comes into association with idea …
loses its seriousness, because it grows small” (emphasis in original). But also
because of the play impulse, and simultaneous with this ﬁrst effect, everything nec-
essary (in terms of scientiﬁc materialist causation), “as it meets with perception…
puts aside its seriousness, because it grows light” (emphasis in original).20 Putting
these two phenomena together, the play impulse sees the actual world as merely
the indifferent raw materials with which to shape new aesthetic creations.
For Schiller, another helpful way of understanding the relationship among the
three impulses, as well as the centrality of the play impulse, is to look at their
respective objects. In the Fifteenth Letter, Schiller explains that the object of the
sense impulse “may be called life in the widest sense of the word; a concept which
expresses all material being and all that is immediately present in the senses”
(emphasis in original). The object of the form impulse, on the other hand, “may be
called shape, both in the ﬁgurative and in the literal sense; a concept which includes
all formal qualities of things and all their relations to the intellectual faculties”
(emphasis in original). The object of the play impulse, ﬁnally, “can therefore be
called living shape, a concept which serves to denote all aesthetic qualities of phe-
nomena and—in a word—what we call Beauty in the widest sense of the term”
(emphasis in original).21 Beauty is thus, for Schiller, “living shape,” and one could
argue that no more ﬁtting symbol for vital and dynamic shape exists than the
dancer in motion.
Schiller reemphasizes the play impulse later in the Fifteenth Letter through his
(perhaps surprising) claim that “in every condition of humanity it is precisely play,
and play alone, that makes man complete.” As if this were not a strong enough
claim, he goes on to assert that “Man plays only when he is in the full sense of the
word a man, and he is only wholly Man when he is playing” (emphasis in original).
The implication here is that human beings and culture for Schiller are inherently
and lightheartedly creative, constructive, and experimental. Schiller’s claim that
the essence of being human lies in the ability to play seems less overreaching,
though, in light of his reference two sentences later to “the whole fabric of aesthetic
art, and the still more difﬁcult art of living.”22 In other words, Schiller views human
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life as a kind of ongoing artwork, in which we both act as painter and serve as
medium—canvas, acrylics, and vision. Extrapolating from Schiller, everyday life
and the business of politics—as component parts of the “art of living”—may be
seen as dances, or ways of moving gracefully through daily existence and its power
negotiations.
Coming down from this pinnacle, however, Schiller concedes at the beginning
of the Sixteenth Letter that “the utmost that experience can achieve will consist in
an oscillation between the two principles” of sense and form. So the play impulse
for Schiller is never fully realized at any given moment, but is rather a process of
oscillating. In this way, one could argue that the play impulse resembles the process
through which dancers respond to the sensuous rhythms of their music by creating
forms (playfully). Even more speciﬁcally appropriate to dance, moreover, is Schil-
ler’s rhetoric (in the next paragraph) of “relaxing” and “tightening.” The play
impulse, Schiller claims, “must relax by tightening both [sensuous and moral]
natures evenly, and it must tighten by relaxing both natures evenly.”23
Schiller closes this letter by reference to, on the one hand, the “melting beauty”
necessary for the “tense man,” and on the other hand, the “energizing beauty” vital
for “the languid man.” Both kinds of beauty, he elaborates, “dissolve” “in the unity
of the ideally beautiful, just as those two opposite forms of humanity are absorbed
in the unity of the ideal man.”24 Again, Schiller seamlessly unites the personal and
the political, by way of the ideal man, who is both aesthetically pleasing and politi-
cally persuasive. And again uniﬁcation is achieved through the language of aes-
thetic physicality that is, arguably, powerfully suggestive of dance.
With a similar textual choreography, Schiller writes in the Seventeenth Letter of
a deﬁcit of “harmony” and “a lack of energy” as the two sources of human imper-
fection. He also writes there of the “taut” condition, either sensuous or intellectual,
of a person in need of relaxing beauty. Schiller beautifully brings together all of
these ideas in the ﬁrst sentence of the Eighteenth Letter: “Through beauty the sen-
suous man is led to form and to thought; through beauty the spiritual man is
brought back to matter and restored to the world of sense.”25 Dance, again, seems
particularly well-equipped to ground (in physical, tangible realities) those who
ﬂoat on spiritual planes and to inspire (through reﬂection) those too susceptible to
their senses.
Near the end of the entire text, grace starts to take on a new dimension for Schil-
ler. He refers to the “grace of Nature” as that which allows human beings the
opportunity to achieve moral freedom, provided that beauty has tamed the restless
(sense) impulse and brought the abstract (play) impulse back to everyday life.
Schiller also describes “the faculty which is restored to [the human] in the aesthetic
disposition” as “the highest of all gifts,” and even as “the gift of humanity.”26 In this
way, Schiller’s analyses, evocative of the etymology of grace—that is, beautiful
force—connect explicitly with grace’s conceptual meanings—that is, divine gifting.
The end of On the Aesthetic Education of Man also includes analyses that are
particularly resonant with dance, thus fulﬁlling the foreshadowing I have identiﬁed
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in earlier letters. The ﬁrst dance-resonant moment concerns a hierarchy of the ﬁne
arts based on the resistance, in a given art form’s material, to taking on new forms:
“The real artistic secret of the master consists in his annihilating the material by
means of the form, and the more imposing, arrogant, and alluring the material is in
itself … the more triumphant is the art which forces back material and asserts its
mastery over form” (emphasis in original).27 One can easily read dance into this
central insight, because the dancer must discipline the body to such an extent that
it appears to be but an outward expression of his/her inward form-making capabil-
ity. Moreover, dance takes for its material source the human being as a whole—
body, mind, and soul; moral freedom; and sensuous existence. Arguably no mate-
rial is more resistant to new forms than the human body per se, which implies that
the aesthetic transformation of the entire body—as in dance—is, on Schiller’s
terms, the most triumphant possible artistic accomplishment.
To support this claim, one need only appeal to the prevalence of dance rhetoric
in Schiller’s ﬁnal few letters. First, Schiller writes in the Twenty-Sixth Letter of how
“the intellect leaps out over the light to the objects.”28 Leaping has always been an
integral part of dance, at least as far back as Plato, and continuing to the present
day. In fact, in many languages (such as Hebrew, Latin, and German) the same
verb (in Latin, salir) means both “to leap” and “to dance.”
Second, the Twenty-Seventh Letter refers to how animals “squander” their
“superabundant life” “in joyous movements,” and of “the leap to aesthetic play.”29
The history of philosophy abounds in comparisons (and even identiﬁcations) of
expressions of joyous movement to dance. Moreover, we have seen the degree to
which Schiller’s play impulse resonates with dance.
Finally, in this same letter Schiller invokes dance by name for the ﬁrst time in
this collection, observing how this “lawless leap of play,” mentioned earlier,
“becomes a dance.” This ﬁnal letter also contains, alongside this speciﬁc reference
to dance, three additional references to grace.30 I take these speciﬁc references to
dance and grace, in close proximity with one another, to be the explicit manifesta-
tion of an underlying logic in this text. Put more strongly, they appear to constitute
a climactic coming-to-awareness for Schiller of dance’s importance for his thought.
To fully appreciate Schiller’s concept of grace, it is pertinent to consider brieﬂy
two themes from his other major works—speciﬁcally the value of na€ıvete and
beauty’s transformation of matter. In “On Na€ıve and Sentimental Poetry,” Schiller
casually uses the word “grace” early in his discussion of the na€ıve poet and poetry:
“From the na€ıve way of thinking there ﬂows of necessity a na€ıve expression, and it
is the most important element of grace.”31 He deﬁnes “the na€ıve manner of think-
ing” as that which “combines childlike with childish simpleness”; it is a manner of
thinking that evokes “a feeling in which cheerful patronizing, respect and melan-
choly ﬂow together” (emphasis in original). Schiller then deﬁnes na€ıvete per se as
 See, for a few examples, the thinkers noted above in a similar context, namely Condillac, Nietzsche, Ralph Ellison,
Julia Kristeva, and Luce Irigaray.
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“a childlikeness, where it is no longer expected” (emphasis in original). In a footnote
to this discussion, Schiller contrasts (a) the (positive) na€ıvete of “a free and
healthy” child, who “dispenses with” “overly affected manners,” with (b) the (nega-
tive) quality evinced by “the stiff posturing of the dance-master.”32 Thus, Schiller
indirectly links grace and dance, and valorizes the playfulness of children, who
typically perform the spontaneous, natural movements of dance, over the formal
dance of professional adult dancers.
In “‘Kallias or Concerning Beauty: Letters to Gottfried K€orner,’” Schiller claims
that “Beauty is nothing less than freedom in appearance.” The reader will note that
movement qua freedom is a typical way of describing dance as an art form. More-
over, in the subsequent (second) Kallias letter, Schiller makes another claim that
gestures toward dance. He distinguishes between two different acts: “to give a con-
cept of beauty and to be moved by beauty” (emphasis in original). Thus, Schiller
not only emphasizes motion and beauty, but also distinguishes between them. And
dance does the same, highlighting motion and beauty, which may (but need not)
be combined as the beautiful unfolding of forms. The same Kallias letter also
deﬁnes “form” as “an exhibition of freedom,” and then delimits a “beautiful” form
to that which “explains itself without a concept” (emphasis in original).33 Dance,
too, articulates itself without need of intermediary (non-gestural) concepts.
In the same vein, several letters later (on February 23, 1773), Schiller uses the
extended metaphor of a “workhorse” and a “palfrey” (a type of riding horse) to show
the connection between, on the one hand, external constraints, and on the other hand,
a natural freedom of movement. Schiller observes that the workhorse’s “movement no
longer springs from its nature,” whereas the palfrey “has never become accustomed to
exerting greater effort than it feels like exerting in its most perfect freedom,” and there-
fore “moves ever so lightly, as if it weighed nothing at all.” This description of defying
gravity (a common trope for types of Western dance) already suggests a dance. This
connection is then intensiﬁed by the next sentence, which Schiller sets off in quotes:
“The speciﬁc form of the horse has overcome the nature of bodies, which must follow
the rules of gravity, to such an extent that one is not reminded that it is a body at all”
(emphasis in original).34 This is exactly what happens, for example, in skillful ballet.
The dancer overcomes gravity and inertia to such an extent that the spectator begins to
see lines, shapes, andmovement, rather than persons.
Finally on this note, Schiller argues that, since a perpetually curving line is more
beautiful than a jagged one—namely, because a “movement seems free” if “one
cannot name the particular point at which it changes its direction”—one is “both-
ered by every dancing-instructor’s intrusion into positions.”35 Although his words
seem to criticize rather than afﬁrm dance, the next paragraph reverses that impres-
sion. There, Schiller returns to the oscillation between the personal and the politi-
cal already noted in connection with On the Aesthetic Education of Man. For this
reason, that paragraph—reuniting dance and grace—serves well to conclude the
foregoing analyses of Schiller.
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It is striking how one can develop gentility (beauty in social relations) from my concept of
beauty. The ﬁrst law of gentility is: have consideration for the freedom of others. The sec-
ond: show your freedom. The correct fulﬁllment of both is an inﬁnitely difﬁcult problem,
but gentility always requires it relentlessly, and it alone makes the cosmopolitan man. I
know of no more ﬁtting an image for the ideal of beautiful relations than the well danced
and arabesquely composed English dance. The spectator in the gallery sees countless
movements which cross each other colourfully and change their direction willfully but
never collide. Everything has been arranged such that the ﬁrst has already made room for
the second before he arrives, everything comes together so skillfully and yet so artlessly
that both seem merely to be following their own mind and still never get in the way of
the other.36 (emphasis in original)
One has merely to recall the obligatory dance scenes in any ﬁlm adaption of a
Jane Austen novel, in order to picture what Schiller describes here.37 As the camera
zooms into a close-up view of just one dancer or her partner, the viewer perceives
the dance motions as free, voluntary, and expressive (in their subtle idiosyncrasies)
of the singularity of each person. From a wide view of the entire dance ﬂoor, how-
ever, the dance motions appear to be necessary and automatic, and to follow the
prearranged harmony of the celestial bodies. In short, the charm is in the details,
while the power sustains the whole.
Synthesizing these analyses based on the etymology of grace in Schiller’s On the
Aesthetic Education of Man, “On Na€ıve and Sentimental Poetry,” and The Kallias
Letters yields the ﬁrst element of the ampliﬁed conception of grace for the Figura-
tion philosophy of dance: grace is superabundantly playful. The beauty and charm
here lie in the “play” of the play impulse, the “na€ıvete” of the na€ıve way of being,
and the “beauty” that perfectly transforms matter. The power and force, by con-
trast, reside in the “impulse” of the play impulse, the “being” of the na€ıve way of
being, and the (according to Schiller) “perfect” transformation effected by beauty.
By these charming powers, in every sense of the phrase, dance engages in over-
coming gravity and heaviness. This is particularly evident in children’s play, social
and romantic dances, and the seamless, acrobatic leaps of expert ballet dancers.
But even apparent counterexamples, such as dances of mourning or war, though
they might communicate gravitas, are not in fact unreﬂective. This is a crucial
point. The conscious or ceremonial act of rendering a state of grief and/or the pur-
suit of detached skill lift the dancer out of the direct and unmediated experience of
the event. That is, no matter how intense the grief of the dancer, s/he remains self-
possessed enough to execute premeditated or communally sanctioned steps.
Grace as organism/environment role-reversal in Dewey
While grace is important to Schiller, it holds equal, if not greater, signiﬁcance for
Dewey. Although one might summarize the meaning of “grace” for both Schiller
and Dewey as “exemplary being in the world,” for Schiller the emphasis would be
on “exemplary,” while for Dewey it would be on “being.” In other words, grace is
an axiological term for Schiller and a metaphysical one for Dewey. Above all,
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Dewey conceives of grace as the condition whereby an organism moves so
smoothly and adaptively through its environment that, from the perspective of a
human observer, the environment appears to move through the organism. The
central features of this gracefulness are economy and continuity of movement,
both of which are paradigmatic characteristics of dance. Appropriately, then,
almost every time Dewey invokes grace in Art as Experience, he invokes dance as
well. In fact, as noted above, Art as Experience boasts more references to dance
than does any other classic text in the Western philosophy of art. The words
“dance,” “dancer,” and “dancing” appear a total of twenty-ﬁve times in Art as
Experience, and they only appear an average of ﬁve times in all of the others.y This
means that Art as Experience mentions dance ﬁve times more often than the aver-
age canonical text in the history of Western aesthetics.
The ﬁrst chapter of Art as Experience, “The Live Creature,” opens with the claim
that “the existence of works of art upon which the formation of an esthetic theory
depends has become an obstruction to theory about them.” In other words, receiv-
ing the artwork as product overemphasizes its thing-nature and facilitates an
underestimation of the activity or process whereby that product was created.
Against this backdrop, Dewey claims, “the actual work of art is what the product
does in and with experience.” Dewey sees his own contribution to the philosophy
of art as that of restoring “continuity between the reﬁned and intensiﬁed forms of
experience that are works of art, and the everyday events, doings, and sufferings
that are universally recognized to constitute experience.”38 This task implies that
Dewey considers any sufﬁciently rareﬁed and/or intensiﬁed form of experience as
a work of art.
One of Dewey’s ﬁrst and most memorable examples conﬁrms this point. “The
sources of art in human experience will be learned by him who sees how the tense
grace of the ball-player infects the onlooking crowd.” Note that Dewey locates the
source of the artwork speciﬁcally in the dynamics of the how—that is, in
the observer’s learning of the relationship between the player’s grace and the
onlookers’ aesthetic experience. As stated above, grace is one of the two central
concepts in Dewey’s book, the other being “rhythm,” which appears for the ﬁrst
time shortly thereafter. There the context is a discussion of “feasting,” “ﬁghting,”
 For more on Dewey’s view of grace, see Steven Fesmire, John Dewey and Moral Imagination: Pragmatism and Moral
Ethics (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003), especially chapter 7, “The Moral Artist”; and Victor Kestenbaum,
The Grace and the Severity of the Ideal (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), especially chapters 7 and 8, on
the poet Wallace Stevens and divine grace respectively.
y This ﬁgure derives from Google searches for all appearances of the words “dance,” “dancing,” and “dancer.” The
“canonical” texts indicated are Theodor Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory (4), Aristotle’s Poetics (6), Clive Bell’s Art (7), R. G.
Collingwood’s Principles of Art (18), Benedetto Croce’s Guide to Aesthetics (0), Arthur Danto’s Transﬁguration of the
Commonplace (6), Nelson Goodman’s Languages of Art (20), G. W. F. Hegel’s Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics (0),
Martin Heidegger’s “Origin of the Work of Art” (3), David Hume’s “Of the Standard of Taste” (0), Immanuel Kant’s Cri-
tique of Judgment (4), Friedrich Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy (13), Plato’s Republic (2), Plotinus’s “On Intelligible
Beauty” (Ennead V.8) (0), Arthur Schopenhauer’s World as Will and Representation (6), Leo Tolstoy’s What Is Art? (5),
and Richard Wollheim’s Art and Its Objects (0). If one brackets Dewey’s fellow pragmatists/process philosophers (i.e.,
Nietzsche and Goodman), as well as Collingwood (given his idiosyncratic focus on community theater), the remain-
ing texts refer to dance an average of only three times.
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“worship,” and all the other “rhythmic crises that punctuate the stream of living.”
Dewey’s central aesthetic concepts—grace and rhythm—resonate strongly with
even the most casual dancer. Further, Dewey goes on to name dance explicitly in
relation to basic human experience: “Dancing and pantomime, the sources of the
art of the theater, ﬂourished as part of the religious rites and celebrations.”39
In the second section of this ﬁrst chapter, devoted to Dewey’s uber-concept of
“experience,” grace and rhythm reappear (again in that order) in the ﬁrst two
pages. “The organs with which [the human] maintains himself in being are not of
himself alone, but by the grace of struggles and achievements of a long line of ani-
mal ancestry.” That is, Dewey sees human organs not as objects, but as manifesta-
tions of our evolutionary ancestors’ adaptive actions. Rhetoric that can only come
from the experience of dancing then shapes Dewey’s two subsequent claims. First,
life “consists of phases in which the organism falls out of step with the march of
surrounding things and then recovers unison with it” (emphasis added). And sec-
ond, the organism “grows when a temporary falling out is a transition to a more
extensive balance of the energies of the organism with those of the conditions
under which it lived” (emphasis added). It is “rhythm,” ﬁnally, through which this
“balance and harmony” are achieved.40
In the last three pages of the chapter, rhythm and grace each make a ﬁnal
appearance. Dewey writes that all “interactions that effect stability and order in the
whirling ﬂux of change are rhythms.” In the following passage, Dewey again draws
his exemplars of the aesthetic from animal behavior: animals exhibit “motion
merging into sense and sense into motion—constituting that animal grace so hard
for man to rival.”41 It is a matter of effortless grace, in other words, for nonhuman
animals to go seamlessly from action to perception and back again, and to do so
without privileging one or the other.
To summarize the foregoing analyses of Dewey’s ﬁrst chapter, “grace” consti-
tutes the “how” dimension of aesthetic experience and, thereby, its “evaluative”
dimension. Rhythm, complementarily, comprises the “what” of aesthetic experi-
ence, and thereby its “ontological” dimension. Put differently, rhythm determines
whether a given phenomenon in the course of experience counts as aesthetic. Fur-
ther along, Dewey identiﬁes rhythm with the following terms: “form,” “rationality,”
“balance” and “symmetry.”42 Grace describes the success, goodness, or perfection
of that which rhythm makes aesthetic. Put symbolically, if x is insufﬁciently rhyth-
mic, then x 6¼ art. If x is rhythmic but insufﬁciently graceful, then x 6¼ high quality
art. One could encapsulate Dewey’s aesthetics with the statement: “That which is
rhythmic is art, and that which is also graceful is good art.”
Chapter 4 of Art as Experience, “The Act of Expression,” contains two points
germane to the present investigation. First, Dewey explicitly applies his concept of
“transdermal transaction” to his aesthetics. He elaborates on this concept in the
later book, Knowing and the Known (1949), authored with Arthur Bentley.
“Organisms do not live without air and water, nor without food ingestion and radi-
ation,” the coauthors claim. “They live, that is, as much in processes across and
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‘through’ skins as in processes ‘within’ skins.”43 In Art as Experience, Dewey writes,
“The epidermis is only in the most superﬁcial way an indication of where an
organism ends and its environment begins.”Why? A “living creature cannot secure
what belongs to it without an adventure in a world.”44 This claim constitutes
Dewey’s most signiﬁcant contribution to the concept of grace. To wit, he re-envisions
the organism and its environmental boundaries such that the body’s physical limit
(i.e., the skin) does not mark the organism’s functional or metaphysical limits.
I would extend Dewey’s proposition by arguing that the porous nature of
the organism is the condition for the possibility of grace’s ﬁgure/ground rever-
sal. With the construct of ﬁgure/ground reversal, my intention is to capsize
the Cartesian notion that subjects are active agents while objects in the world
are merely passive recipients of activity. Instead, my paradigm recognizes the
environment as active and agential. And going beyond a conception of ﬁgure/
ground reversal as mere perceptual or epistemological reversal, I propose a
metaphysical understanding. To wit, in the phenomenon of grace, environ-
ments become the fundamental ontological ﬁgures, while organisms recede
into the environments’ ground.
The second point relevant to this study concerns Dewey’s discussion of speciﬁc
expressive arts. Among these arts, Dewey lists “dance and sport,” deﬁning them as
“activities in which acts once performed spontaneously in separation are assembled
and converted from raw, crude material into works of expressive art.”45 Note how
Dewey situates dance close to everyday reality, which proximity calls to mind his
overarching goal to restore the continuity between art and the aesthetics of every-
day experience.
Dewey elaborates on this point in regard to dance only a few pages later, where
he asserts that external communicability is necessary for a genuine act of aesthetic
expression. “The war dance and the harvest dance of the savage,” Dewey observes,
“do not issue from within except there be an impending hostile raid or crops that
are to be gathered.”46 Dewey’s point, as I take it, is not to purvey a modern/tribal
or nature/culture distinction. On the contrary, he addresses what tribal art (e.g.,
the war dance) has in common with modern art (e.g., a dance performance): a
communicative dimension in response to an external source, be it the opposing
warring tribe or the audience. What is more, for Dewey, indigenous art is superior
to modern Western art in that the former integrates function into itself, while the
latter tends to be compartmentalized. Like Schiller, Dewey problematically invokes
the “savage” as the connection between dance and contemporary Western aes-
thetics. That is, Dewey shares with Schiller a Romantic valorization of certain
aspects of cultures placed lower on the Enlightenment’s imperial/colonialist hierar-
chy. Or, more precisely, two simultaneous hierarchies are in play for Dewey, with
non-Western society placed on the top rung of the ﬁrst ladder (concerning the
integration of the arts), and on the bottom rung of the second ladder (concerning
artistic independence and complexity or sophistication).
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Similarly, a few pages later (and, again, as Schiller does) Dewey draws the con-
nection between dance and childhood. Dewey writes of the “dancing” of “little chil-
dren,” and of the “rhythmic movement of happy childhood.”47 These remarks,
taken together, constitute support for an argument I develop elsewhere that West-
ern philosophy tends (1) to associate the inclination to dance with members of dis-
empowered communities (including women, non-whites, non-heterosexuals,
children, the “insane,” etc.), and (2) to suggest a connection between tribal peoples
(including tribal Africans and Native Americans) and Western children (do tribal
peoples represent the stunted childhood of humanity?) by referring to the two
groups in close proximity.
Dewey also makes several other references to dance that merit brief mention.
First, in chapter 3, “Having an Experience,” he refers to “going through rhythmic
movements in the dance.” We have already seen how closely Dewey links grace
and rhythm. This chapter also mentions “dances” in a list of aesthetic activities
that Dewey views as emblematic of the balanced relationship between “doing” and
“undergoing,” which he claims makes aesthetic experiences so fulﬁlling.
Chapter 5, “The Expressive Object,” names, as the ﬁrst item in a list of necessary
conditions for a successful expressive act, “the existence of motor dispositions pre-
viously formed” in “[a] surgeon, golfer, ball player, as well as a dancer.” The same
paragraph refers to “a graceful deer.”48 Thus, Dewey ties the “tense grace” of the
baseball pitcher from chapter 1 directly to a dancer’s grace.
In chapter 7, “The Natural History of Form,” Dewey discusses how “the partici-
pation of man in nature’s rhythms” eventually “induced him to impose rhythms
on changes where they did not appear. The apportioned reed, the stretched string
and taut skin rendered the measures of action conscious through song and dance.”
Dewey thus sees dance as vital to our creation of aesthetic rhythms, as distinct
from human rhythms entirely shackled to nature. In this same paragraph, the
philosopher attributes the power of visual artworks to bring “the very essence of
the lives of [serpent, elk, boar] to realization” to the fact that such artworks depict
those animals as “enacted in dance.” Thus, dance helps us to understand the very
natural phenomenon from which it helps us to achieve partial emancipation.
Moreover, in this chapter Dewey asserts that dance appears “in all times and pla-
ces.”49 For Dewey, dance is a transhistorical, transcultural constant.
Finally, Dewey accords dance a pivotal place in his observations about the classi-
ﬁcation of the arts. Before beginning his own, provisional attempt at such a classiﬁ-
cation, Dewey claims that dance has been classiﬁed as “a mixed art” because it has
 For this claim’s detailed support from feminist philosophers and critical race theorists, see Joshua M. Hall, “St. Vitus’
Women of Color: Dancing with Hegel,” Comparative and Continental Philosophy, vol. 9, no. 1 (2017), forthcoming;
Joshua M. Hall, “Self-Mimetic Curved Silvering: Dancing with Irigaray,” Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy,
vol. 22, no. 1 (2014): 76–101; Joshua M. Hall, “Reattaching Shadows: Dancing with Schopenhauer,” PhaenEx: Journal
of Existential and Phenomenological Theory and Culture, vol. 9, no. 1 (2014); Joshua M. Hall, “Syncopated Communi-
ties: Dancing with Ellison,” Southern Literary Journal, vol. 45, no. 2 (2013): 57–71; Joshua M. Hall, “Revalorized Black
Embodiment: Dancing with Fanon,” Journal of Black Studies, vol., 43, no. 3 (2012): 274–88; and Joshua M. Hall, “Chor-
eographing the Borderline: Dancing with Kristeva,” Philosophy Today, vol. 56, no. 1 (2012): 49–58.
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to do with both spatiality and temporality. This alone, he claims, constitutes “a
reductio ad absurdum of the whole rigid classiﬁcatory business.”50 Such is the
power of dance for Dewey, that it can single-handedly reduce a philosophy of art
to ruins. Presumably, theater and opera, which also incorporate spatial and tempo-
ral dimensions, possess the same power, but they do not seem to be uppermost in
Dewey’s mind as aesthetic continuities with everyday experience.
Dewey’s novel, minimalist approach to this classiﬁcation task involves only two
types of art, which he terms the “automatic” and the “shaping.” The automatic arts
in Dewey’s sense take the combined unit of the “mind-body” as their medium,
while the shaping arts “depend to a much greater extent upon materials external to
the body.” Of the automatic arts, Dewey takes “dance” as his ﬁrst example. For
Dewey, dance includes “cultivation of voice, posture, and gesture,” which “add
grace to social intercourse.” Counter-intuitively, the shaping arts—that is, the cus-
tomary pantheon of painting, sculpture, architecture, music, and poetry—depend
for their very aesthetic status on the automatic arts, including dance. And this is
true for Dewey even though these automatic arts do not include a single traditional
ﬁne art. “Something of the rhythm of vital natural expression,” Dewey elaborates,
“must go into carving, painting, and making statues, planning buildings, and writ-
ing stories.” Dewey then crystallizes his point: what must enter into the other arts
is “something as it were of dancing” (emphasis added).51 In other words, Dewey
insists that every art is necessarily, qua art, a kind of dance. Hence, each of the tra-
ditional ﬁve ﬁne arts of poetry, music, painting, sculpture, and architecture
depends in some manner on dance. Although one might counter that Dewey is
talking about the process of art making rather than the artworks as ﬁnal products,
recall that Dewey explicitly deﬁnes the artwork as the process of the transforma-
tion of human experience. An artwork is not, therefore, the object or material
ground of this transformation.
Synthesizing these conceptual analyses of grace in Dewey’s Art as Experience
yields the second aspect of the ampliﬁed conception of grace for the Figuration
philosophy of dance: grace is ﬁgure/ground reversing. In other words, grace as a
phenomenon is the result of a kind of gestalt switch. In this switch, more precisely,
the object that is normally perceived as foreground becomes background. And the
object that normally constitutes the background becomes the foreground.
To clarify, this switch is something akin to the moment, during the viewing of
an Impressionist painting, when one stops seeing the brushstrokes as the inert
application of color to the canvas, and experiences the carefully shaped mounds of
oil paint as themselves central to the artwork—as if one were running one’s ﬁngers
over the painting like a bas-relief map. An organism is graceful, in this sense, when
it effaces its own particularity to such an extent that it becomes merely a conﬂu-
ence of both its inner ﬂow and the outer currents that condition and transcend it.
So, too, a graceful dancer becomes a mere occasion for the virtuosity of both the
materials and the environment (including stage decor costuming, and dancers’
bodies).
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Put differently, aesthetic gracefulness always takes place against a certain back-
drop, a complex environment. And expression only becomes aesthetic through the
organism’s (or artist’s, or artwork’s) Deweyan “transactions” with this environment.
These transactions, or complex interactions, highlight the raw materials that have
been artistically reworked rather than merely deposited in an unassimilated state.
The resultant move of grace in the philosophy of ﬁguration
Synthesizing my etymological analyses of grace in Schiller with my conceptual
analyses of grace in Dewey, I would propose that the Move I call “grace” can be
understood, in part, as a superabundantly playful phenomenon of ﬁgure/ground
reversing. To rehearse the insights elaborated above, grace is superabundantly
playful (from Schiller) insofar as it has to do with living shape, or beauty, which is
the object of the play impulse. And grace is ﬁgure/ground reversing (from Dewey)
insofar as it is the result of an organism-as-ﬁgure adapting so perfectly to its envi-
ronment-as-ground that the environment seems to be moving through the organ-
ism instead of vice versa.
To connect Figuration theory to another theoretical discourse on dance, the
Move of grace may be seen as closely related to Laban’s analytical concept of
“Flow,” which involves the way that a body moves through personal and objective
space. According to Laban for Actors and Dancers, a concise introduction to Lab-
an’s work written by his student Jean Newlove, Laban conceptualizes movement as
inherently linguistic, speciﬁcally as “a two way language process through which the
human body could communicate by giving and receiving messages.” Newlove also
claims that, for Laban, “Dance is to movement as poetry is to prose.”52 This anal-
ogy reinforces Figuration’s claim that poetry constitutes a privileged access to
dance.
The basis of Laban’s work, Newlove explains, is the “kinesphere,” the “space
within our reach, our ‘personal’ space.” Within this space, Newlove continues, “the
four motion factors, Space, Time, Weight and Flow can inﬂuence the movement
and attitude of an individual,” and any given human “action requires … all
four.”53 More speciﬁcally, a movement can range, on a set of multiple continua,
from (1) “ﬂexible” to “direct” in how it traverses space, (2) “sustained” to “sudden”
in how it consumes time, (3) “light” to “strong” in its attitude toward weight, and
(4) “free” to “bound” in how it ﬂows.54 Combining the values of three of Laban’s
four variables (Space, Time, and Weight), generates what Laban calls the “Eight
Basic Effort Actions,” namely “press, wring, glide, ﬂoat, thrust, slash, dab, ﬂick.”
Against this backdrop, Laban’s speciﬁc movement quality of Flow, which ranges
from “bound” to “free,” may be compared to Figuration’s Move of grace, in this
regard: both Flow and grace concern the aesthetics of communication or the style
of the material basis of the communication. As Newlove puts it, “Flow can be
related to precision and progression.”55
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To contemplate these insights from Laban in a way consonant with Figuration,
the Move called “grace” constitutes the “how” dimension, the metamorphoses or
transformations phenomena undergo as organisms and environments ﬂow
through each other in acts of communication. Figuration thus ﬁnds, in the concept
of grace, the modality of its primary activity, namely the carrying out of communi-
cation. The critical dimension of this aspect of Figuration for philosophy is its
claim that the aesthetic dimension of an activity always involves a transgressive
self-overcoming of the limitations of the concept “human.” (Here, I use the word
“transgressive” in its positive sense, much as queer theorists do when they valorize
the willful violation of repressive norms.) More speciﬁcally, these transformations
involve transactions between (1) seriousness and gravity, (2) the human body’s
physical boundaries and the environment, and (3) the human being’s metaphysical
boundaries and the opposing poles of the animalistic and the divine.
How does the critical function of grace play out in actual analyses of members of
the seven families of dance mentioned at the beginning of the essay? Below, using a
particular example from each of the seven families, I explore the explanatory
potential of Figuration philosophy. I begin with the conventional or commonsensi-
cal usage of the Move, and move on to the two adjectival aspects and the one sub-
stantive core of the ampliﬁed philosophical construct. Additionally, in the case of
the literal/human dances, I brieﬂy consider formal insights into the logic or struc-
ture of dance movement per se. For this, I draw on the technical studies of Rudolf
Laban and Andre Levinson.
To summarize my argument thus far, the commonsense meaning of “grace” is
“an aesthetically pleasing and seemingly effortless quality of movement.” The ﬁrst
ampliﬁed aspect is superabundant playfulness; the second ampliﬁed aspect is
ﬁgure/ground reversal; and the substantive core is meta-human gifting. By the lat-
ter phrase, I mean that the grace of dance is something that precedes humanity,
both in the sense of animality and also of divinity; it transcends what it is to be
human and resituates human existence in relation to the rest of the cosmos. As
evinced in the tenth-to-eleventh-century philosopher Abu ‘Ali al-Husayn ibn Sina
(usually Latinized as “Avicenna”), of present-day Uzbekistan, dance is meta-
human gifting insofar as it is the mark of the celestial beings—that is, the planets
understood as angels—who in medieval Judeo-Arabic metaphysical systems pro-
vided revelation to the prophets, decipherable in the planets’ astronomical orbits
around the godhead.56
For ballet, the commonsensical account of grace leads to the ease, beauty, and
apparent weightlessness with which dancers move through space. Examples range
from the “how” of the ﬂuttering steps executed en pointe to that of the bounding
leaps of virtuosos such as Mikhail Baryshnikov. Grace ﬁnds ballet’s superabundant
playfulness in the frequency with which dancers imitate imaginary beings and
symbolize light and airy nonhuman aspects of the world. The ﬁgure/ground rever-
sal of ballet manifests in the way ballet almost completely hides the awkward and
bulky humanity of the dancers in lines and ﬂows. And the meta-human gifting of
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ballet lies in the fact that it transforms the human dancer into a kind of holy ani-
mal, like a pure dove, devoid of speech and possessed of a radiance such as might
result from staring into the face of a god. To paraphrase these insights at the level
of the family of concert dance in general, according to the Figuration philosophy
of dance, the grace of concert dance consists in a playful ritual in which the outlines
of a human world dapple the backdrop of self-effacing human beings, who are criss-
crossed and transcended by a play of forces that both predate and spring beyond
mundane human existence.
Beginning with Laban, the grace of ballet derives in part from its energetic
extensions of the human body into regions of the kinesphere and dynamosphere
that are usually neglected in everyday movement. Additionally, grace concerns bal-
let’s privileging (over the body) of the invisible lines and shapes that the body met-
aphorically traces through space, especially in Laban’s ﬁgure of the icosahedron.57
Levinson maintains that ballet’s grace derives directly from its vertical orientation,
the phenomenon of turnout exempliﬁed in the ﬁve positions, and the rising of the
body on pointe shoes. All three phenomena, for Levinson, remove the body from
its gravitational human particularity, and toward a weightless, geometric ideality.58
For clogging, commonsensical grace manifests in the unwavering smiles, the
uncompromisingly erect upper bodies, and the untiring whirls of legs and feet
under piston-like knees. Grace ﬁnds superabundant playfulness in the strenuous
legwork pounding into the ground toward no practical end. Figure/ground reversal
reveals itself in the strong emphasis placed (visually) on the bending and rising of
knees and (audibly) on the contact of feet with ground—two core aspects of
human locomotion, without which the entire ediﬁce of civilization would be
impossible, but which must fade into the background in everyday life to permit
focus on the sophisticated work of the hands, mouth, and frontal lobes. And meta-
human gifting in clogging lies in the fact that the dancers’ bodies are transformed
into, and re-presented as, precision machines. They are comparable, in this way, to
the machines on a Ford assembly line or in a steel mill and symbolize the ruckus
of the human being channeled into unmediated production. To paraphrase these
insights at the level of the family of folk dance in general, according to Figuration,
the grace of folk dance consists in its making light, in every sense of that phrase, of
the community’s practical pursuits, by emphasizing the stylistic aspects of practical
movement, and thereby emphasizing the nonhuman forces that sustain those
pursuits.
From Laban’s perspective, clogging’s grace would perhaps lie in its imaging of
long-standing rituals in Appalachia, such as the rigid movement patterns involved
in life in the coal mines and steel mills—speciﬁcally the use of the two effort
actions he terms “slashing” and “punching.” In clogging’s case, the knees slash
through the air, and the legs punch the ground in what Laban terms “stamping.”59
As for Levinson, he would probably deny clogging any grace whatsoever, in part
because it is a folk/vernacular dance form, which for him is necessarily mechanical
and animalistic; and in larger part owing to its history as a fusion of Irish step
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dancing and African-American tap. In regard to Africana dance, Levinson observes
that its greatest dancers, among whom he counts Josephine Baker, can only achieve
individual grace either by leaving behind these “primitive” dances, or by trans-
forming them into hybrid dance forms—that is, by fusing them with what he terms
more “civilized,” Western concert dances (such as ballet).60
For salsa, the notion of commonsensical grace lies in the smoothness with which
bodies move individually, in partnership, and in communal manipulation of space.
Grace ﬁnds superabundant playfulness in salsa’s redeploying of erotic, romantic,
and athletic skill sets in the context of a public space dedicated to intimate enter-
tainment. Figure/ground reversal manifests in the fact that such skillful move-
ments—which normally work best when they appear effortless and self-effacing
(in actual courtship, seduction, and athletic competition)—in salsa constitute the
phenomena in which the dancers channel their complex individuality. And meta-
human gifting in salsa lies in the fact that the best dancing requires both (1) sur-
rendering to one’s animal instincts, and also (2) offering up one’s own ﬁnite body
to the godlike ideals of beauty and prowess. To paraphrase these insights at the
level of the family of societal dance in general, according to Figuration, the grace of
societal dance consists in practicing, in a casual public setting, vital intimate skills
rooted in abilities much older than humanity and symbolizing perfection inﬁnitely
beyond it—but practicing them as though they were instead merely ornamental.
Laban’s perspective on salsa’s grace, which I infer from his analogy between
ﬁghting and dance, lies in the way that, during partnering, the two dancers’ kine-
spheres interact in the mode of an attacker and defender. In this way, the grace of
salsa foregrounds the antagonistic dimension of gendered romantic interaction.61
Given the Spanish/Moorish ancestry of salsa, Levinson’s analyses of traditional
Spanish dance are also relevant. In brief, Levinson argues that Spanish dance is a
hybrid of two formal principles that he identiﬁes in “Western” and “Eastern”
dance, respectively. To wit, “the West” ﬁnds its emblem in outward extension; “the
East,” in inward enclosing; and the Spanish hybrid is thus the curve manifested by
the letter “S,” winding forever between its Arabic-African ancestry and its Euro-
pean parentage.62
For tae kwon do, the commonsensical idea of grace rests in the smooth and
apparently effortless breaking of wood and the transition from one move to
another in a “form” or choreographed series of attacks and defenses. Grace ﬁnds
superabundant playfulness in the fact that these activities, though designed for
combat and warfare, appear in tae kwon do in controlled settings, with either
imaginary or staged opponents. Figure/ground reversal manifests in the fact that
movements useful for defense against physical violence function to systematically
pursue the expressly stated purpose of achieving psychological discipline and tran-
quility. And meta-human gifting in tae kwon do lies in the practitioner’s attempt
to take a godlike, comprehensive view of combat, thus allowing her/him to com-
pensate for the evolutionary loss of “animalistic” means of self-defense such as fur
or claws. To paraphrase these insights at the level of the family of agonistic dance
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in general, according to Figuration, the grace of agonistic dance consists in make-
believe reenactments of combat, facilitated by emphasizing the non-combative bene-
ﬁts of such reenactments—a project that can be understood as a divinely ambitious
recreating of humans in the image of the animal playing of our evolutionary
forbears.
For the pollen dance of the honey bee, the commonsensical notion of grace per-
tains to the ability of such brief and localized activities to enable the nutritional
continuity of the hive. Grace ﬁnds superabundant playfulness in the pollen dance’s
dramatic recreation, inside the hive, of the actual foraging for nectar outside the
hive. Figure/ground reversal manifests in the fact that the pollen dance works by
subordinating the individuality of the dancing bee to its communicative function
of “dancing” a literal roadmap of the environment it has just successfully traversed.
And meta-human gifting lies in the fact that the complex and sophisticated activi-
ties of a nonhuman animal have facilitated the education of human animals
through careful study of bees throughout our history. To paraphrase these insights
at the level of the family of animal dance in general, according to Figuration, the
grace of animal dance consists in its dramatization of practical activities, a process
that highlights the importance for the species of activities that surpass the existential
viability of any particular animal, and that, moreover, suggests an analogously
greater importance of the sum total of nonhuman species relative to the human one.
(The implications of the latter premise would lead us, for example, to repudiate
human practices that perpetuate species extinction and climate change.)
Regarding “falling stars” or “shooting stars,” their smooth and rapid progress
through the night sky lends itself to the commonsensical notion of grace. Grace
ﬁnds superabundant playfulness in the apparently nonchalant end of the existence
of the so-called “star” (in fact, they are meteorites rather than actual stars). Figure/
ground reversal manifests in the fact that stars, which normally fade into the back-
ground to illuminate scenes of purposeful human activity, take on a more robust
sense of agency and redirect the human mind to a cosmic world beyond earth.
And meta-human gifting lies in the fact that minerals from former stars serve as
the material basis for human eyes—which eyes gaze on the ﬁnal moments of other
stars’ lives, light years away.63 To paraphrase these insights at the level of the family
of astronomical dance in general, according to Figuration, the grace of astronomical
dance consists in the apparent triviality, relative to human perception, of cosmically
signiﬁcant phenomena—phenomena that ironically point to the cosmos as a site of
independent meaning that, in turn, makes the human observation of the cosmos pos-
sible in the ﬁrst place.
And ﬁnally, the reader or listener experiences the commonsensical notion of
grace in Neruda’s poetry, particularly in the smooth transitions (1) among images
and sounds, denotations and connotations, as well as (2) among physical and
metaphysical, personal and social aspects of reality. Grace ﬁnds superabundant
playfulness in Neruda’s democratization, and seemingly chaotic intermixing, of all
these aspects of language and reality. Figure/ground reversal manifests in the
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paradox that what is meaningful for humans becomes the background against
which the antics of the nonhuman and the meaningless are staged for their own
sake. And meta-human gifting lies in Neruda’s redirecting of the divine aims of
poetry toward the prehuman and nonhuman layers of the earth. To paraphrase
these insights at the level of the family of discursive dance in general, according to
the Figuration philosophy of dance, the grace of discursive dance emerges in the
equalizing of various aspects of reality through language, where language slips its
yoke of practicality in order to gesture toward the nonhuman forces that constitute
the human and constantly reweave us.
Conclusion
To recap this presentation of the third Move of Figuration theory, the etymology of
“grace,” from the ancient Greek kharis, shows its dual meaning of beautiful power.
An etymological analysis of grace as “beautiful force” in three of Schiller’s major
works reveals that, for him, grace is central to the play impulse, the na€ıve way of
thinking/being/writing, and the perfect transformation of matter into beauty.
A conceptual analysis of grace in Dewey’s Art as Experience leads me to crystallize
grace as “organism/environment reversal” and to establish its intimate linkage
with rhythm and, thereby, its foundational import for dance. Finally, an
application of the Move of grace to a series of speciﬁc instances of actual and
metaphorical dances reveals this Move’s versatility and efﬁcacy in explaining the
stylistic powers of dance—in short, the aesthetically potent communication of
which dance is capable.
Notes
1. See Joshua M. Hall, Figuration: A New Philosophy of Dance (Ph.D. diss., Vanderbilt Univer-
sity, 2012), http://etd.library.vanderbilt.edu/available/etd-07192012-180322/.
2. For an overview of phenomenology, see Edmund Husserl, The Essential Husserl, ed. Donn
Welton (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999); and Martin Heidegger, Basic Writ-
ings, ed. David Farrell Kress (New York: Harper, 2008).
3. See, for example, J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 2nd ed., ed. J. O. Urmson and
Marina Sbisa (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975).
4. Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man (New York: Dover, 2004); Friedrich
Schiller, “On Na€ıve and Sentimental Poetry,” in Essays: Friedrich Schiller, eds. Walter Hin-
derer and Daniel O. Dahlstrom (New York: Continuum, 1993), 179–260; and Friedrich
Schiller, “‘Kallias or Concerning Beauty: Letters to Gottfried K€orner,’” in Classic and
Romantic German Aesthetics, ed. J. M. Bernstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003), 145–84.
5. John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: Perigee, 2005).
6. See William F. Wertz, Jr., “A Reader’s Guide to Schiller’s Letters on the Aesthetical,” Fidelio,
vol. 14, nos. 1–2 (2005): 80–104.
7. See William F. Wertz, Jr., trans., “‘Introduction’ to ‘Friedrich Schiller: Kallias, or On the
Beautiful,’” Fidelio, vol. 1, no. 4, (1992): 53–56.
8. Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man, 23.
9. Ibid., 25, 27.
96 J. M. HALL
10. Ibid., 27–28.
11. Ibid., 31.
12. See, for example, Andrew Hewitt, Fascist Modernism: Aesthetics, Politics, and the Avant-
Garde (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 61.
13. Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man, 47, 58.
14. Ibid., 48.
15. Ibid., 54, 54–55.
16. See Susan McClary, “Music, the Pythagoreans, and the Body,” in Choreographing History,
ed. Susan Leigh Foster (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995), 82–104.
17. Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man, 56–57.
18. Ibid., 63.
19. See Joshua M. Hall, “Core Aspects of Dance: Condillac and Mead on ‘Gesture,’” Dance Chroni-
cle, vol. 36, no. 3 (2013): 352–71; Joshua M. Hall, “Slanted Truths: The Gay Science as
Nietzsche’s Ars Poetica,” Evental Aesthetics (forthcoming); Joshua M. Hall, “Syncopated Com-
munities: Dancing with Ellison,” Southern Literary Journal, vol. 45, no. 2 (2013): 57–71; Joshua
M. Hall, “Choreographing the Borderline: Dancing with Kristeva,” Philosophy Today, vol. 56,
no. 1 (2012): 49–58; and Joshua M. Hall, “Self-Mimetic Curved Silvering: Dancing with Iri-
garay,” Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy, vol. 22, no. 1 (2014): 76–101.
20. Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man, 74, 78, 78.
21. Ibid., 76 (all quotes in this paragraph).
22. Ibid., 79, 80, 80.
23. Ibid., 81, 82, 82.
24. Ibid., 84.
25. Ibid., 87.
26. Ibid., 101.
27. Ibid., 106.
28. Ibid., 126.
29. Ibid., 133, 134.
30. Ibid., 136, 139, 140.
31. Schiller, “On Na€ıve and Sentimental Poetry,” 190.
32. Ibid., 182, 183; 184; 185.
33. Schiller, “‘Kallias or Concerning Beauty,’” 152, 153, 154, 154.
34. Ibid., 164.
35. Ibid., 173.
36. Ibid., 174.
37. See, for example, Stuart Hopps (choreographer), Sense and Sensibility, directed by Ang Lee
(Los Angeles: Columbia Pictures, 1995), DVD; and Sue Lefton, Emma, directed by Douglas
McGrath (Santa Monica: Miramax, 1996), DVD.
38. Dewey, Art as Experience, 1, 1, 2.
39. Ibid., 3, 5, 5.
40. Ibid., 12, 12, 12, 13.
41. Ibid., 15, 18.
42. Ibid., 153, 175, 185.
43. John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley, Knowing and the Known, in The Later Works of John
Dewey, vol. 16, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press,
2008), 119.
44. Dewey, Art as Experience, 61.
45. Ibid., 66.
46. Ibid., 69.
47. Ibid., 75.
DANCE CHRONICLE 97
48. Ibid., 101.
49. Ibid., 154, 158 (only last quote).
50. Ibid., 231.
51. Ibid., 236–37.
52. Jean Newlove, Laban for Actors and Dancers (New York: Routledge, 1993), 11, 13.
53. Ibid., 22, 70.
54. Ibid., 70, 71, 73.
55. Ibid., 75, 114.
56. See Avicenna, The Metaphysics of The Healing, trans. Michael E. Marmura (Provo, UT:
Brigham Young University Press, 2005).
57. See, for example, Rudolf Laban, Choreutics (Alton, Hampshire, UK: Dance Books, 2011),
18, 27.
58. See Andre Levinson, Andre Levinson on Dance: Writings from Paris in the Twenties, eds.
Joan Acocella and Lynn Garafola (Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University Press), 42.
59. Laban, Choreutics, 30.
60. Levinson, Andre Levinson on Dance, 73.
61. Laban, Choreutics, 39.
62. Levinson, Andre Levinson on Dance, 54.
63. Charles Scott, The Lives of Things (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 99–112.
JOSHUA M. HALL is an assistant professor of philosophy at CUNY, Queensborough. His cur-
rent research focuses various historical and geographical lenses on philosophy’s boundaries,
particularly at the intersection of aesthetics, psychology, and social justice. His publications
include a coedited anthology on philosophical practices in prisons, Philosophy Imprisoned;
thirty peer-reviewed journal articles (in Philosophy and Literature, Journal of Aesthetic Educa-
tion, and Southern Literary Journal, among others); nine anthology chapters (for example, in
Mind on the Move: Reﬂections at the Intersection of Dance and Cognitive Science); and thirty
conference presentations, including three invited-speaking engagements, and presentations for
the American Psychological Association, and all three divisions of the American Philosophical
Association. His related work in the arts includes one chapbook collection and sixty-ﬁve indi-
vidual poems, appearing in literary journals internationally, including multiple Pushcart Prize
winners Ibbetson St. Magazine, Main Street Rag, and Shampoo, and twenty years of experience
as a choreographer, instructor, and performer.
98 J. M. HALL
